Hypnosis as Altered State of Consciousness

The structure of this section begins with the explanation of concepts, followed by supporting theory and research studies. The variable examined in the present study is the subjective experience of high hypnotizable individuals. Therefore, this section begins with explaining related concepts to understand the variable studied.

2.1.1 Introduction

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It is important to define Consciousness, before going to explain hypnosis as altered state of consciousness. Pekala (2009) defines Consciousness as one’s awareness of one’s subjective experience, including both the processes of being aware and the various contents of that awareness. This includes what Husserl (1913/72) would define as:

The noeses (the subjective intentional acts of consciousness, i.e., perceiving, willing, imaging, etc.) and noema (the objects of consciousness, i.e., thoughts, feelings, visualizations, etc.) of that experience, including whatever awareness/attention is capable of being aware of, and also encompasses states and altered state of consciousness. (Pekala,1991, p. 34)

Tart (1972) defines altered state of consciousness (ASC) as “a qualitative alteration in the overall pattern of mental functioning such that the experiencer feels his [or her] consciousness is radically different from the ‘normal’ way it functions” (Pekala, 1991).

As pointed out by Barber, 1969 an altered state of consciousness can be defined as ‘the output resulting from a particular input’ (Kihlstorm, 2008).

The hypnotized subject demonstrate positive hallucination (see things that are not there), negative hallucination (fail to see things that are there) volitional control (loss control of behaviour and experience) amnesia as a result of a hypnosis. One explanation offered by Kilhlstorm (1984) is that hypnosis results in altering of both monitoring (phenomenal awareness) and controlling (voluntary thought and action) aspects of consciousness. Although hypnotic induction procedure can be considered as input for altered state, this alone is not sufficient to produce hypnosis. Other factor such as the ability of the person to be hypnotized is also important to experience altered state. Therefore, ‘introspective self-reports accounts of subjective experience is central to the definition of any altered state of consciousness’ (Kihlstrom, 2008)

Hilgard (1975) Shor (1959, 1962) stated that ‘the trance controversy in hypnosis concerns the extent to which trait, situational, and state variables account for more of the variance of hypnotic response’ (cited in Pekala, 1991). Tellegen (1979) suggested focusing on interacting variables (trait, state and situation) to explain hypnotic response.

2.1.2 Research

Studying the pattern (that is the relationship of sub dimensions) and structures of consciousness as a function of hypnotic susceptibility, which contribute to determine a particular state of consciousness as suggested by Tart (Pekala, 1991).

Pekala investigated the structure of consciousness to determine the phenomenological effects of hypnosis as a function of individual difference. High susceptible will report different pattern of phenomenological subsystems of consciousness to hypnosis as against baseline condition, low susceptible.

Pekala presented a methodology to statistically assess states of consciousness. He proposed that if high susceptible reported significant pattern difference in phenomenological experience and a subjective sense of altered state (SSAS) compared to other state then they can be determined as experiencing ASC. Results supported this hypothesis, revealing that for hypnotic condition, all reported altered state of awareness against eye closed sitting quietly period. Although, high susceptible reported increase SSAS they showed less variation in structure (pattern of subsystem) during hypnotic condition. Suggesting that hypnotic induction has less effect on subsystem of pattern structure during hypnosis, which is different of medium and low susceptible. Pattern analysis was done using Jennrich chisquare test and graphically represented through Psygrams. The same study was conducted by Pekala and Kumar (1989) with different subject pool and results supported the previous study. This proves the replicability of the methodology in assessing pattern structures across stimulus condition and subject groups. Sample for these studies were participants of introductory psychology course. Sample size ranged from 6 to 400 plus in the above mentioned studies conducted by Pekala.

In the present study since the focus is on examining the structures and pattern of subjective experience of only one group (high susceptible) in one stimulus condition (hypnosis), within group analysis will be carried out. To find out if all high susceptible experience altered self awareness and various other dimensions. Pattern of their experience will be studied by examining their intensity score on dimensions of PCI through Phenomenological Intensity Score (PIPS). Since the sample size is 10 psygram cannot be computed, as it requires minimum of 50- 60 samples.

2.2 Subjective experience:

Hilgard (1975) stated that ‘hypnotic responsiveness is more a matter of the characteristics of the subject than of the state produced by the hypnotic induction’. Studying dimensions of subjective experience in relation to trait aspect will help in determining why some individuals easily enter altered state of consciousness (Pekala,1991). Therefore, it is important to distinguish trait and state aspects.

According to Orne, the ‘essence’ of hypnosis lies in the subjective experience of the hypnotized individual. The internal, private experiences of a hypnotized individual are also crucial along with examining their behavioural responses to hypnotic suggestions for developing a comprehensive understanding of hypnotic abilities (McConkey, 2008; Sutchiff, 1958, 1960, 1961; Hilgard, 1969, 1971, 1973; Shor, 197, 1979; Orne, 1972; Spanos and Barber, 1974).

Rainville and Price (2003) described a model of conscious phenomenology that demonstrates the experiential characteristics of hypnosis. ‘Consistent with Barabasz et al. (1999) who showed that ERPs markers ‘aˆ¦ reflect alterations in consciousness that correspond to participants’ subjective experiences of perceptual alteration’, Rainville and Price’s model of consciousness shows that the experiential dimensions of relaxation, absorption (focused attention), orientation and self-monitoring reflect basic phenomenal properties of consciousness’ (Barabasz & Barabasz). In other words, the study points out that these changes in experiential dimensions of individuals are associated with changes in their brain activity produced by hypnosis. ‘There is currently an agreement that, in addition to the changes in external behaviour, suggestions presented in a hypnotic context may give rise to changes in subjective experience. Yet, there is no general agreement about the theoretical framework within which these changes in experience should be explained’ (Kallio and Revonsuo 2003).

Woody and McConkey (2003, 2005) argued for a need of componential approach to assess ’emergent properties of hypnosis and that there may be changes in consciousness during hypnosis’ (McConkey, 2008). Through factor analysis they yielded four subscales of direct motor, motor challenge, perceptual-cognitive and post-hypnotic amnesia responding. This was drawn based on factor analysis of Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility: Form A and Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form C. These subscales form the building block of hypnotic response. They underlie different subjective experience triggering specific property that is required to respond to different subscales. For example a motor challenge suggestion involves experience of involuntariness; prototype of trying to do something but failing, whereas for Perceptual-cognitive subscales involve feeling of external reality in the face an inconsistent actual reality, prototype of hallucination for this kind of experience. They analyzed data from four experiments to examine different building blocks of hypnotic response. ‘These were experiments on (a) suggested color blindness (Mallard & Bryant, 2001), (b) posthypnotic amnesia for autobiographical memory (Barnier et al., 2004), (c) verbal posthypnotic suggestion (Barnier & McConkey, 1996, Experiment 2), and (d) motor posthypnotic suggestions (Barnier & McConkey, 1999b)’. Woody and Szechtman (2000) advanced the idea that hypnosis modifies underlying “feelings of knowing,” or subjective convictions, and this view is consistent with a long tradition that has emphasized the subjective underpinnings of hypnotic responses (e.g., Sutcliffe, 1960, 1961).

Woody and McConkey (2008) suggested that future research may focus on examining subjective experience and state changes of individuals during hypnosis to predict hypnotic response. In this study PCI-HAP records the dimensions of subjective experiences for perceptual-cognitive suggestion (2 minute sitting quite period, to continue the experience of vacation that is hypnotic dream suggestion), in post assessment quantitatively and qualitatively record subjective experience to direct motor (finger raising) and motor challenge (eye catalepsy). The purpose is not to predict hypnotic response using PCI but to assess subjective experience underlying highly hypnotizable individual’s hypnotic response.

In summary, although hypnotic suggestions can produce measurable changes in overt behaviour these alone do not define the essence of hypnosis. Instead, certain subjective experiences are the crux of hypnosis. Therefore, tracking experience of hypnosis is as important as measuring behavioural response for understanding the hypnotic phenomena.

2.3 Hypnotizability
2.3.1 Introduction

Hypnotizability, hypnotic suggestibility, hypnotic susceptibility, hypnotic responsiveness these terms is used interchangeably in this paper. Kirsch and Braffman (1999) defined “non-hypnotic suggestibility “to denote responsiveness to suggestions administered without the prior induction of hypnosis” and “hypnotic suggestibility is responsiveness to suggestions given after hypnosis has been induced” (Pekala, 2009). Hypnotizability is “the capacity to produce those effects generally considered to be ‘hypnotic’” (Weitzenhoffer, 1997). Holroyd (2003) suggests that classically, “suggestion is defined as a communication that is accepted uncritically, in a process that is non-rational” (p. 121). In hull’s (1933) studies it was found that hypnotic suggestibility and non-hypnotic suggestibility is very highly correlated emphasizing the role of individual’s ability than on the altered state of consciousness (Lynn, Krisch and Hallquist, 2008).

Since ‘Hypnotic susceptibility relates specifically to the subject’s ability to respond to various hypnotic phenomena of which suggestibility is but one’ (Raz, Fan, & Posner, 2005), ability of the subject to respond to suggestion in hypnotic and non hypnotic context may also be important. Therefore, ‘this ability infuses many aspects of life, ranging from a tendency toward absorption defined as total engagement in self-altering experiences, to having hypnotic-like interactions with others irrationally or experience interactions with others as occasions for uncritical response in advertent suggestions.’ (Spiegel, 2008, p. 183).

Hypnotic suggestibility holds different meaning to different theorist, it is important to note that hypnotizability here is defined from traditional view that is defined operationally as ‘the number of suggestions that an individual responds to on standard scales’ (McConkey and Barnier, 2004). Thus, a ‘hypnotizability measure’ typically involves administering a standard induction procedure, suggesting a number of hypnotic experiences, and scoring responses according to predetermined pass/fail criteria. Hilgard (1981) used “hypnotic susceptibility” and “hypnotizability” interchangeably.

Hilgard largely agreed with Hull that hypnosis was a plane of heightened suggestibility. Although in the present study no assessment was done in regard to suggestibility and non-hypnotic suggestibility, since the focus is on studying the phenomenological experience among highly hypnotizable.

Hypnotizability is considered as a stable trait (Piccione, Hilgard and Philip 1989) as tested over 25-year period. Others have argued that it is an ability that can be modified with increasing knowledge about hypnosis, providing training in responsiveness and simulation of contextual effects (Diamond, 1974; Sponas, 1986). Vaitl et.al ., (2005 ) in the article Psyhcobiology of Altered States of Consciousness stated that ‘The effectiveness of hypnotic suggestion in producing corresponding changes in experience (i.e., hypnotic susceptibility) varies greatly from individual to individual and is a highly stable attribute of the person’.

Fassler, Lynn and Knox’s (2008) conducted a test-retest study design to answer the question Is hypnotic suggestibility as a stable trait? They found that hypnotic responsiveness is stable overtime and can be shaped by variables that affect non hypnotic behaviour such as expectancies and boredom. They stated that correlation between attitude and hypnotic susceptibility in the range of .20 and .30 and that positive attitude is important but not sufficient factor in hypnotic responding. They also found that expectancies are significant predictors of hypnotic experience and their subjective experience changed from first session to second session. Therefore, they stated that ‘subjective experience as an important determinant in hypnotic responsiveness has to be further researched and included in theories to explain variation in subjective experience for hypnotic suggestions’.

Since, enhancing of hypnotizability has proved to achieve a small degree of modification (Gorassini, 2004), in this study hypnotizability is considered as a stable trait. This study initially assesses trait using HGSHS: A and assesses phenomenological experience of state effects using PCI-HAP.

2.3.2 Measuring hypnotizability

Hypnotizability can be measured based on the individuals performance on a standardized scale. Among thirteen available hypnotizability scale, Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form A was the most widely used scale. 74 laboratory research used HGSHS: A from the period of 1992-2003 as reported in International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis. (Barnier and Mc Conkey, 2004 p 35).

The existing hypnotizability scale (Harvard Group Scale & Standford Scale for Hypnotic Susceptibility) allows categorizing people into high, medium and low hypnotizables based on their behavioural response and provide space for response regarding one’s experience. Higher the score on these scales, higher the ability to be hypnotized. Since, these scales do not score subjective experience as a measure for hypnotzability, separate experiential scales are development in the attempt to measure and track the individual’s experience of hypnosis (Sheehan and McConkey, 1982; McConkey, 1991).

Many early measures of hypnotizability scale investigated the depth of hypnotic experience of individuals (for example: Harvard Continuous Scale, Cheek, 1959; Orne and Evans, 1966; Field inventory of Hypnotic depth, field, 1965; Hilgard and Tart, 1966) although majority of the scales measure behavioural response. The effects of hypnosis can be analyzed not just by measuring behavioural response but also by examining the subjective experience of the individuals.

Barneir and McConkey (2004) after reviewing a number of studies noted that high hypnotizable persons measured across scales ( HGSHS:A, SHSS:C,CURSS,HIP) time (1974 to 2004) and cultures (European, Australian, African-American, who speak Spanish, German, English or sign language) remain same.

2.3.3 Profile Differences

The study of individual difference has lead to the development of the field in terms of measuring and understanding hypnotizability (Woody and Barnier, 2008). Clinical anecdotes, theories of hypnosis, experimental findings suggest that there exist individual differences in behaviour and experience demonstrated by high hypnotizables. These differences may due to difference in latent typological accounts and dimensions (experiential), but this area of research is dormant (Terhune and Cardena, 2010). McConkey and Barnier (2004) also suggested that hypnotizability and/or hypnotic responding may involve both dimensional and typological accounts, which need to be examined conceptually and empirically. Therefore, identifying the individual differences on phenomenological experience becomes important.

High susceptible (HS) demonstrate characteristics different from low susceptible which are typically associated with absorption, use of vivid imagery and they process information automatically, they show distinct patterns of brain activity (Barnier and McConkey, 2004)

Highly hypnotizable individuals actively process the suggestion in order to present the hypnotic behaviour. Some high suggestible individuals may place a strong belief to the phenomenal reality of their subjective experience during hypnosis. The attribution they place to their subjective experience also contributes to diversity in their phenomenological experience. Therefore, it is important to consider cognitive and social factors as both contribute in belief and attribution place by highly hypnotized persons.

To examine individual difference and obtain specific profiles for assessment with regard to hypnotic performance two scales were developed such as Standarford Profile Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form I and Form II (Weitzenhoffer and Hilgard, 1963, 1967) and Diagnoistic Rating Scale (DRS: Orne and O’Connell, 1967). This showed that high hypnotizables did not show uniform pattern in response. These scales were for assessing hypnotic performance and not for phenomenological experience assessment. Other phenomenology approach and measures developed to assess subjective experience of hypnotic phenomena is mentioned in detail under phenomenology approach of this paper.

‘Theory and research on intelligence is serve as interesting parallel to theory and research of hypnotisability’ (Woody & McConkey, 2005). Gardner’s (1983) concept of multiple intelligences considered intelligence as something that is varied among individuals, therefore, there is not one kind of intelligence but there exist multiple intelligences. (Woody & McConkey, 2005). Similarly hypnotizability also exists in variation among individuals, resulting in multiple hypnotizabilities. In this study pre-selection of hypnotizability based on HGSHS (trait assessment) is carried out and variation in state experience is assessed using PCI. Therefore, it is a study focusing on trait-state effects.

McConkey (2008) suggested that it is essential to integrate individual differences with general psychological principles for comprehensive understanding of hypnosis. Woody and McConkey proposed a componential approach claiming that specific abilities are required for performance of suggestions during hypnosis. It is quite clear that individuals differ in their ability to respond to suggestions under hypnosis and hypnotic response is an influence of specific skills plus general hypnotizability of the individual. Therefore, it is important to find out specific ability of the individual along with general hypnotizability to examine their hypnotic response for different suggestions. This cannot be found when assessing individuals based on their behavioural response alone. Hypnotic response is defined as ‘the act of positing something imagined as real that characterizes a response as hypnotic rather than the content of the imagined event’ (Tellegen, 1979). Examining individuals subjective experience in reference to their response to particular suggestions can prove beneficial to identify abilities that an individual demonstrate to perform the suggestions. (McConkey, 2008).

By studying the similarities and dissimilarities of phenomenological experience of hypnosis, assist in establishing the pattern abilities that exist among highly hypnotizable individual (McConkey and Barnier 2004).

2.3.4 Correlates of Hypnotizability Attitude and Aptitude

Attitude and aptitude are the two elements that ensure hypnosis has or will occur (Barnier and Nash 2008). The correlation between hypnotizability and attitude range from 0.20 to 0.30 and attitude refers to motivation, expectations and willingness of the individuals, which plays an important role for individuals to experience hypnosis. Socio-cognitive theorist (Spanos,1991) claim that these variables can be modified hence, hypnotizability can be enhanced.

Aptitude refers to the ability of the individual and in the absence of hypnotizability, hypnosis as a product cannot be achieved. “Aptitude-centered theories posit that the highly consistent individual differences in hypnotic performance reflect the direct and substantial operation of a latent cognitive ability” (Benham et al., cited by Pekala, 2009)

Sheehan and McConkey (1982; McConkey 1991; Sheehan, 1991) focused on the interaction between cognitions and attributions that hypnotized individuals make about their experiences during hypnosis. They identified different cognitive styles that emerged among highly hypnotizable, which varied within individuals depending on the complexity of the hypnotic experience suggested. These cognitive styles are concentrative (listen to suggestion and wait for it to happen), constructive (actively working on the suggestions received) and independent (change the suggestion to suit their preference) styles. (McConkey and Barnier, 2004) Absorption

Hypnosis is an altered state is naturally experienced by many individuals while engaged in certain activities such as driving a car, reading a book, watching a movie, daydreaming etc. The factor that is responsible for this experience is the so called trait ‘absorption’ mentioned by Tellegan and Atkinson (1974) as ‘almost total immersion in the (imaginal) activity, with indifference to distracting stimuli in the environment’. This trait absorption was found as the correlate to hypnotic susceptibility. (Kirsch, Lynn, Hallquist, 2008)

Tellegen and Atkinson, 1974 defined Absorption as “the openness to absorbing and self-altering experiences”. This personality trait has correlated (r= .38) with hypnotic susceptibility (Pekala, 1991). This was supported by Pekala and colleagues (1988,1989) suggesting that absportion is not necessarily a characteristic of all individuals, because low susceptible reported less absorption during hypnosis against baseline condition such as eyes open/closed. Imagination

Hypnosis Susceptibility scales involve two parts, hypnotic induction and testing of suggestions. Hypnotic inductions are often procedures instruction for mental and muscular relaxation. Suggestions are imaginative in nature (e.g., “imagine a force acting on your hands to push them apart,” Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962, p. 18) imagine your arms getting heavier and heavier and lowering), that can be given in or out of hypnosis. Kirsch and Braffman (2010) emphasized on the role of imaginative suggestions defined as requests to experience an imaginary state of affairs as if it were real. Imaginative suggestibility is the degree to which the person succeeds in having the suggested experiences. Hypnotizability is defined as the effect of hypnosis on response to suggestion.

Braffman and Kirsch (1999) studied the important correlate of imaginative suggestibility as determinants of hypnotic and nonhypnotic suggestibility. Through regression analysis they found that hypnotic suggestibility and nonhypnotic suggestibility was correlated with variables such as response expectancy, attitude towards hypnosis, fantasy proneness and absportion. Hypnotic suggestibility correlated with non hypnotic imaginative suggestibility on variables response expectancy, motivation and fantasy proneness, except absorption. Hypnotizability was significantly associated only with individual differences in expectancy and motivation to respond to suggestion. They stated that ‘Imaginative suggestibility is the ability or trait underlying the automatic movements, partial paralyses, selective amnesias, pain reduction, and hallucinations that are most commonly observed in the context of hypnosis’ and ‘highly suggestible hypnotized subjects display and report these experiences (Krisch and Braffman, 2010). Involuntariness / Automaticity

In so far as there is consensus that involuntariness is the core phenomenological feature of hypnotic responses (Kihlstrom, 2008; Kirsch & Lynn, 1998; Weitzenhoffer, 1980). They indicate that the relationship between involuntariness and hypnotic suggestibility is modulated by (typological) experiential response to a hypnotic induction (Nash and Barnier, 2008). According to Barnier, Dienes and Mitchell (2008) the experience of involuntariness, a characteristic feature of hypnotic response was explained by Weitzenhoffer (1974) as classic suggestion effect, ‘the transformation of the essential, manifest ideational content of a communication’ into behaviour that is experienced as involuntary.

The above mentioned variables are only few of the correlates of hypnotic susceptibility form the socio-cognitive theorist’s perspective.

2.3.5 Theories

Vaitl et al., (2005) ‘Current theories of hypnosis emphasize the enactment of self-directed cognitive strategies (Spanos, 1986), response expectancies (Kirsch, 2000), or alterations in central executive control (Bowers, 1992; Farvolden & Woody, 2004) as

processes mediating response to hypnotic suggestion’. Disassociated Control Theory

Based on Norman and Shallice (1986) model of action control, this theory states that involuntariness is the result of hypnotic induction which leads to inhibition of high-level executive or Supervisory attentional systems (SAS) or central processing resources responsible for control of volition (will). The suggested phenomena are the result of activation of low-level cognitive control structures or schemata, triggered by hypnotist words and not attention. (Woody and Sadler, 2008; Brown and Oakley, 2004)

This theory contrasts neodissociation and sociocognitive approaches which explain hypnotic behaviour of involuntariness as attribution of involuntariness, but executed voluntarily. One limitation of this theory is that hypnotic phenomena can be suggested without hypnotic induction; therefore the explanatory power of dissociated control theory is reduced. (Brown and Oakley, 2004) Response set theory

Kirsch and Lynn 1997 mainly emphasize on subjective experiences under hypnosis. They propose that subjects enter hypnosis with generalized response expectancy, engaging in experiencing the suggestion given by hypnotist leading to alteration in their experience, which depends on the response sets (relationship between individual action and events in environment) placed before execution of behaviour. Therefore, subjects experience involuntariness of hypnotic behaviour by attributing it to external cause. The role of expectancies and intentions do not require much attention, therefore response is automatic or quasi-automatic operation and this interferes in ‘initiating, interrupting, continuing and terminating action’. Motor movements may require less or no attention, but motor challenge entail ‘intentionality and attentional resources to produce and maintain suggested response'(Lynn, Kirsch and Hallquist, 2008) . Therefore, it is suggestions and altered experience that triggers response sets operating in a mindless, automatic manner.

Empirical evidence supports response set theory demonstrated in Dual-task methodology showed that interference in challenging tasks increased for high susceptible under hypnosis. Response set theory assumes that ‘generating the subjective experience is necessary for activation of expected response resulting in increased interference’ (Brown and Oakley, 2004). Barber (1999) Three dimensional theory of high hypnotic suggestibility

Barber (1999) argued that there exist three types of highly responsive participants and proposed a three dimensional theory of high hypnotic suggestibility. They are the fantasy prone, the amnesia prone and the positively set participants. The fantasy prone were identified initially with in-depth interview, revealing that these participants engaged in pretend play as children, enjoying life like sexual fantasies highly , experienced vivid and realistic fantasy based experience. Only one percent of college students are amnesia-prone and fantasy prone, majority of the HS are positively set participants. They present positive attitudes towards the idea of hypnosis, positive motivation to perform and experience as suggested, positive expectation to experience suggested effects, positive set to visualize suggestions. (Lynn, Meyer and Shindler, 2004)

Phenomenology Approach and hypnotic experience
2.4.1 Introduction

Hypnosis researchers continuing struggle for scientific recognition have always been concerned about methodological techniques. Sutcliffe (1958, 1960) argued that the fundamental difficulty in convincing people about the genuineness of hypnotic effects is that hypnosis is essentially a private experience. Thus, ‘hypnosis has always been faced with challenge of scientifically quantifying internal, subjective experiences’ (Nash and Barnier, 2008).

It important to understand what is phenomenology, before looking into various phenomenological approach suggested by various researchers. Smith defines the discipline of phenomenology initially as the study of structures of experience, or consciousness. ‘Literally, phenomenology is the study of “phenomena”: appearances of things, or things as they appear in our experience, or the ways we experience things, thus the meaning things have in our experience’ (Smith, 2008). A phenomenon is “any object perceived by the senses or consciousness” (Flew, 1979, p. 248).

Woodard (2003) has given a comprehensive historical overview of the development of theory and research on hypnotic experience, which is presented as follows. Research approaches to study hypnotic experience can be broadly classified into two categories. Firstly, Quasi-Phenomenological approaches to research labeled as phenomenology but maintain quantitative emphasis. This approach includes Shor’s Method, Sheehan and McConkey’s Experiential Analysis Technique and Pekala’s Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI). Secondly, Pure-Phenomenological approach includes Arrigo’s Hermeneutical-Phenomenological Research, Beshai’s Phenomenology of Hypnosis, Cowles Existential-Phenomenological Model, Woodard’s phenomenological and perceptual methodology and Sundararajan’s Heideggerian Approach.

2.4.2 Pure Phenomenology

Phenomenological research methods to study hypnotic experience based on philosophical phenomenology are : Arrigo’s Hermeneutical-Phenomenological Research (1998) with Neurolinguistic Programming (NLP) to investigate changing belief with NLP technique called reimprinting (changing limiting belief about the self), she investigated two therapist-client interactions during hypnosis session and meaning was drawn from bridging her internal experience of an external viewpoint through observing videotapes. Beshai’s Phenomenology of Hypnosis (1974), he stated “Phenomenology views hypnosis as a social, interactional phenomenon involving dialectic between perception and imagination, between the subject and the hypnotist, or between the self and other” (p.220). He investigat

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